2025–2026

The Parliament of the
Commonwealth of Australia

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT (STAFF) AMENDMENT (FAIR AND INDEPENDENT STAFFING) BILL 2026

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

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GENERAL OUTLINE

1. A Parliament in which the Executive decides how many staff the rest of the Parliament may employ is not a fully functioning Parliament. It is an Executive with a chamber attached. The Members of Parliament (Staff) Amendment (Fair and Independent Staffing) Bill 2026 ends that arrangement.

2. Section 4 of the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984 (the MOP(S) Act) lets the Prime Minister decide, in writing, which parliamentarians may employ personal employees. Section 12 lets the Prime Minister approve the arrangements and conditions of that employment, including how many employees an office-holder may have. Neither power is confined by a formula, a published criterion, a duty of political neutrality, or an independent reviewer. The person whose government is being scrutinised decides the resources of the people whose job is to scrutinise it. That is not an administrative convenience. It is a conflict of interest written into Commonwealth law.

3. Personal employees are not a perk and they are not patronage. They are the people who read a bill, draft an amendment, run a committee, brief a leader and put a question a department would rather not answer. A parliamentarian without that capacity sits in the chamber. A parliamentarian with it can hold a government to account. The distinction is the difference between a vote and a check.

4. The Members of Parliament (Staff) Amendment Act 2023 implemented recommendations of the 2022 review of the MOP(S) Act. It improved employment principles and created a statutory role for the Parliamentary Workplace Support Service. It left the allocation of non-government personal staff inside the Prime Minister's office. The Jenkins rewrite modernised the workplace. It did not modernise the power.

5. The Parliament has already settled the recognition threshold. Regulation 4 of the Parliamentary Business Resources Regulations 2017 treats five members as the point at which a party that is not the Government or the Opposition is a minority party. That status already carries additional salary, travel, postage and office resources. Personal staffing was left outside that recognition and inside a Prime Ministerial discretion. The result is visible on the public record as at August 2026. The Australian Greens, with 11 parliamentarians, have 17 personal employees. Pauline Hanson's One Nation, with 6 parliamentarians, has 4. Both parties meet the five-member threshold. Only one of them is staffed as if that threshold means anything. The Official Opposition, with 68 parliamentarians, has 96 personal employees against 504 on the government side. The ratio is 1.4 to 4.1. That is not a Parliament in balance. It is a government that has kept the numbers.

6. The Bill converts personal staffing for every class of non-government parliamentarian from a Prime Ministerial permission into a statutory entitlement. The entitlement arises by force of the Act. It does not wait on a letter, a meeting or a favourable view of the applicant's politics. Additional positions and classifications sit with the Remuneration Tribunal, acting independently on published and politically neutral criteria. Party leaders, not the Executive, distribute a party's own statutory positions. Political

retaliation, administrative delay and offset against electorate staff or other parliamentary resources are prohibited. Every allocation is published. The Federal Court can compel performance. Fair Work rights are not displaced.

7. The Bill would:

(a) insert objects into section 2A of the MOP(S) Act that state, in terms a court can use, that non-government parliamentarians are entitled to fair, independent and adequate personal staffing, and that staffing must not be used to favour, punish or obstruct a party or a parliamentarian;

(b) give a recognised non-government party — five or more parliamentarians, not the Official Opposition — a statutory minimum of 1.5 personal employee positions per parliamentarian, rounded up, belonging to the party and distributed by its parliamentary leader;

(c) give the Official Opposition a statutory floor equal to the greater of that same 1.5 rate and 22 per cent of the government personal-staff pool, distributed by the Leader of the Opposition;

(d) give smaller non-government parties and independent parliamentarians a floor of one personal employee each, with additional positions available from the Tribunal;

(e) strip the Prime Minister of any power to refuse, reduce, suspend, revoke, qualify, delay or otherwise interfere with those entitlements;

(f) confer additional allocations and classifications on the Remuneration Tribunal, and forbid the Tribunal from having regard to ideology, voting records, criticism of the Government, polling, popularity or ministerial representations seeking favourable or unfavourable treatment;

(g) prohibit politically motivated reductions, administrative avoidance and the offsetting of a staffing entitlement against electorate employees, offices, travel, communications or research support;

(h) require a public Parliamentary Staffing Register, written reasons, annual reporting to both Presiding Officers and an independent review within three years; and

(i) confer Federal Court jurisdiction on an affected parliamentarian, a parliamentary leader, and an employee whose employment is directly affected.

Why the Bill is required now

8. A discretion that can be used to starve a recognised party of advisers will be used that way whenever it is politically convenient. The August 2026 figures are not an anomaly. They are what section 4 produces when the person who holds the pen is a party to the contest. The Bill does not ask that person to behave better. It takes the pen away.

9. The Official Opposition convention — recently around 21 per cent of the government pool, proposed at 22 per cent in the Members of Parliament (Staff) Amendment (Providing Certainty and Improving Integrity) Bill 2025 — remains a convention. Conventions can be cut, delayed or offset without an independent decision-maker and without a public reason. The Bill converts the higher of the 1.5 rate and 22 per cent into a floor that cannot be reduced by the Executive or by the Tribunal.

10. The cost of the floor is not an argument against it. On the August 2026 figures the recognised-party formula lifts One Nation from 4 positions to 9. The Opposition floor lifts the Opposition from 96 to 111. Those 20 positions sit against 504 already allocated to the Government. A Commonwealth that can staff a ministry at 4.1 personal employees per government parliamentarian can staff the rest of the Parliament at 1.5. What it has not been willing to do is let that happen by law.

Drafting Against The Compiled Acts

11. The Bill is drafted against the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984 compilation C2026C00093 (14 March 2026) and the Remuneration Tribunal Act 1973 as in force at the same date. Four numbering and structure choices follow from those compilations.

12. Part III of the compiled MOP(S) Act ends at section 20. Part VI begins at section 28. A new Part inserted after Part III is therefore Part IIIA, numbered sections 21A to 21ZD. The Bill does not insert sections 13A to 13ZD after section 13. That numbering would sit inside Part III and collide with automatic termination, directions, notice, resignation, suspension and IPSC action.

13. Subsection 5(2E) of the Remuneration Tribunal Act 1973 already records that the Parliamentary Business Resources Act 2017 may confer additional functions on the Tribunal. The new function is subsection 5(2F).

14. Paragraph (c) of the definition of office-holder is restated, not dropped. Paragraph (d) is added so that a non-government parliamentarian to whom a statutory minimum or additional position applies is an office-holder by force of Part IIIA. Dropping paragraph (c) would have stripped the existing hook for Prime Ministerial determinations over government parliamentarians.

15. Subsection 11(3) of the compiled Act is the employment power for personal employees (non-Ministerial). The Bill adds subsections 11(3A) and 11(3B) so that power attaches to Part IIIA and cannot be closed off by a section 12 arrangement.

FINANCIAL IMPACT STATEMENT

16. The Bill increases departmental expenditure on personal employees (non-Ministerial) only to the extent that a current allocation sits below the statutory minimum, and to the extent that the Tribunal later determines additional positions under published criteria. It does not create a grant program. It does not alter taxation.

17. On public figures as at August 2026 the recognised-party formula would add 5 positions for Pauline Hanson's One Nation. The Official Opposition floor of the greater of 1.5 × 68 and 22 per cent of 504 would add 15 positions. The Australian Greens already sit on the formula. Independents and parties below five members already sit on, or above, the floor of one in most cases. Twenty positions against a government pool of 504 is not a fiscal event. It is the price of a Parliament that can do its job.

18. Expenditure remains subject to appropriation. Proposed section 21ZC requires the Finance Minister to make reasonable provision in the estimates. An internal budget ceiling cannot reduce a statutory entitlement. That is the point. The numbers are set by the Act and by an independent Tribunal, not by a departmental savings target.

IMPACT ANALYSIS

19. The Bill is machinery of Parliament. It moves a defined class of Commonwealth employment from executive discretion to statute and to an existing independent tribunal. It does not regulate private activity, create a new regulator, or impose a compliance burden on the public.

20. Affected entities are the Department of Finance, the Parliamentary Workplace Support Service, the Remuneration Tribunal, and parliamentarians in their capacity as employing individuals under the MOP(S) Act. Existing employees keep continuity of service. Existing higher allocations are not automatically reduced. A formal Regulation Impact Statement is not required.

STATEMENT OF COMPATIBILITY WITH HUMAN RIGHTS

Prepared in accordance with Part 3 of the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011.

21. The Bill is compatible with the human rights and freedoms recognised or declared in the international instruments listed in section 3 of the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011. It does more than avoid a breach. It removes an existing restriction on rights the Covenant already guarantees.

Rights engaged

22. Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that every citizen has the right and the opportunity, without unreasonable restrictions and without distinction of the kind mentioned in article 2, to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives, and to vote and be elected at genuine periodic elections.

23. Article 22 provides that everyone has the right to freedom of association with others. Article 19 provides that everyone has the right to hold opinions without interference and the right to freedom of expression. Article 2, read with those articles, requires that the rights be respected without distinction of any kind, including political or other opinion.

How the present law restricts those rights

24. Article 25 is a right of effective participation, not a right to sit silently in the chamber. A parliamentarian who cannot employ the staff needed to read legislation, run a committee or represent a constituency is restricted in the conduct of public affairs. Leaving that staff to the Prime Minister's unfettered discretion is an unreasonable restriction of the kind article 25 forbids. Applying that discretion differently according to whether the Prime Minister approves of the party is a distinction on the ground of political opinion of the kind article 2 forbids. The August 2026 allocations are the restriction in numerical form.

25. A registered political party is an association for the purposes of article 22. Staffing that association's parliamentary work according to whether the Executive finds the association convenient is a burden on the association. Reducing staff because a parliamentarian criticised a Minister, voted against a bill or ran an inquiry is a penalty on expression under article 19. Sections 4 and 12 of the MOP(S) Act, as they stand, authorise both.

How the Bill removes the restriction

26. The Bill converts staffing into a statutory entitlement and an independent Tribunal allocation. Comparable parties are treated comparably once they meet the Parliament's own five-member threshold. The Official Opposition is staffed as a class, not as a collection of members who must each ask the Government for resources. Proposed sections 21L and 21W close the penalty on expression. Proposed section 21X closes the administrative workaround.

27. The limits that remain are prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim and are proportionate. Statutory minimums are fixed by formula. Additional positions are determined against published criteria that include the responsible use of public money. Expenditure remains subject to appropriation. The Register publishes allocations, not employee names. Reasons may be redacted for privacy, security and legal privilege. The Bill does not restrict government staffing. It confines the Prime Minister's allocation power to the government side — a classification by office, not a penalty on political opinion.

28. The Bill is compatible with human rights. It promotes articles 19, 22 and 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The present Act, to the extent that it leaves non-government personal staffing to Prime Ministerial discretion, does not.

NOTES ON CLAUSES

Clause 1 — Short title

29. This clause provides that the short title is the Members of Parliament (Staff) Amendment (Fair and Independent Staffing) Act 2026.

Clause 2 — Commencement

30. Sections 1 to 3 commence on Royal Assent. Schedules 1, 2 and 3 commence on the 28th day after Royal Assent. Twenty-eight days is long enough for Finance, the Parliamentary Workplace Support Service and the Tribunal to open positions and prepare the Register. It is not long enough to run out the clock on a statutory entitlement. Item 12 of Schedule 3 authorises administrative preparation before that day.

Clause 3 — Schedules

31. This is the standard schedules clause. Legislation specified in a Schedule is amended or repealed as set out in that Schedule.

Schedule 1 — Amendment of the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984

32. Item 1 adds paragraphs (d) to (i) to the objects in section 2A. Those objects are not decoration. They tell a court and an administrator what the Part is for: fair and adequate non-government staffing, independent allocation, a prohibition on using staffing to favour or punish, protection of scrutiny capacity, transparency, and comparable support for comparable work. A construction that leaves a recognised party on four advisers while another recognised party sits on seventeen is not a construction that gives effect to those objects.

33. Item 2 substitutes the simplified outline in section 2B so that a reader of the compiled Act can see, at the front, that non-government entitlements operate by force of the Act, that the Official Opposition has a separate floor, that additional allocations sit with the Tribunal, and that the Executive cannot interfere.

34. Item 3 inserts the definitions used by Part IIIA. A personal employee position is an authority to employ at 1.0 full-time equivalent, not a named person. A recognised non-government political party uses the same five-member threshold as regulation 4 of the Parliamentary Business Resources Regulations 2017 and excludes a party that forms part of the Official Opposition, so a Coalition in opposition is not paid twice. Staffing allocation matter is drawn widely so that anti-avoidance cannot be walked around by relabelling a decision as funding, classification or process.

35. Item 4 restates paragraph (c) of office-holder and adds paragraph (d). The Bill does not strip the Prime Minister of the power to staff the government side. It stops that power being used on everyone else.

36. Item 5 substitutes section 4. Subsection (1) keeps the Prime Minister's determination power for government parliamentarians and holders of a relevant office. Subsections (2) and (3) create the non-government employment right by force of the Act. Subsection (4) is the Tribunal hook for additional positions. Subsection (5) is the operative prohibition: the Prime Minister has no power to refuse, reduce,

suspend, revoke, qualify, delay or otherwise interfere with those entitlements. The list is deliberate. Each verb is a method that has been, or can be, used to keep a statutory right on paper.

37. Item 6 adds subsections 7(5) and 7(6) rather than repealing subsection 7(4). Subsection 7(4) is the Prime Minister's existing role statement for the government side. Repealing it would have been a wider rewrite than the Bill needs. The new subsections confer Part IIIA functions on the Tribunal and close the implication that subsection (4) authorises the Prime Minister to allocate non-government staff.

38. Item 7 inserts subsections 11(3A) and 11(3B). The compiled employment power for personal employees (non-Ministerial) is subsection 11(3). Those subsections attach that power to Part IIIA and prevent a section 12 arrangement from closing it.

39. Item 8 inserts section 11A. A transfer of a personal employee between non-government employing individuals, where both employers and the employee agree and the transfer is within entitlement, is not a termination. Continuity of service is preserved. Finance and the Parliamentary Workplace Support Service have five business days to give administrative effect. Delay does not break continuity. The provision closes the automatic-termination trap in section 14 that would otherwise treat a change of employing individual as the end of the job.

40. Item 9 confines section 12. The Prime Minister may still determine government-side arrangements. Those arrangements cannot cut, delay, classify down or otherwise circumvent a Part IIIA entitlement. An inconsistent arrangement is of no effect and must be disregarded by Finance and the Parliamentary Workplace Support Service. Where a Prime Ministerial instrument and a statutory entitlement or Tribunal determination conflict, the latter prevails. That is the hierarchy the present Act lacks.

41. Item 10 confines section 13. Terms and conditions applying to non-government personal employees cannot be less favourable than those applying to government personal employees doing substantially comparable work. A determination that discriminates on party, independence, opinion, opposition, voting, committee work or scrutiny is of no effect. A general determination may apply to non-government staff only on materially equal terms. Classification is part of the entitlement. A position that exists only on paper is not an entitlement.

42. Item 11 inserts Part IIIA after Part III.

Part IIIA — the scheme

43. Section 21A is the simplified outline. Section 21B applies the Part to non-government parliamentarians, leaves government staffing to the existing machinery, and forbids an increase in government staffing for the purpose of justifying a cut on the other side. Electorate employees under subsection 11(1) are untouched.

44. Section 21C is the recognised-party formula: number of party parliamentarians × 3 ÷ 2, rounded up. On present numbers that is 17 for the Australian Greens and 9 for Pauline Hanson's One Nation. The entitlement is a party resource. It arises automatically. Neither the Tribunal nor the Executive may reduce it. A party that forms part of the Official Opposition is not a recognised party for this section.

45. Section 21D gives a non-government party below five members, other than the Official Opposition, a floor of one personal employee per parliamentarian. Section 21E gives each independent parliamentarian the same floor. One is the floor, not the working allocation for a senator or member carrying a heavy committee load. Additional positions remain available under Division 3.

46. Section 21EA is the Official Opposition floor: the greater of the 1.5 formula applied to Opposition parliamentarians and 22 per cent of the government personal-staff pool. On August 2026 figures that is

111. The Leader of the Opposition distributes the pool. The entitlement arises automatically and cannot be reduced by the Tribunal or the Executive. Twenty-two per cent is the figure used in the Members of Parliament (Staff) Amendment (Providing Certainty and Improving Integrity) Bill 2025. It is adopted so that a government cannot shrink the Opposition by inflating its own ministry and then refusing the consequential increase.

47. Section 21F states that sections 21C to 21EA are floors, not caps. The fact that an existing allocation exceeds the floor is not a reason to cut it. The Bill does not use a minimum as a weapon against a party that already has more.

48. Section 21G gives the parliamentary leader of a recognised party control of distribution and redistribution. Notice to the Tribunal and Finance is enough. The Prime Minister may not attach a position to a favoured member, freeze a distribution, demand reasons, or hold up payroll. Finance has five business days to give effect. Section 21H fixes the value of a position at 1.0 full-time equivalent. Job-sharing is permitted. Fractionalising a position to reduce its value is not.

49. Section 21J is the Tribunal's power to determine additional positions for listed offices and functions — Opposition leadership, whips, committee chairs, shadow Ministers and other substantial parliamentary functions. A determination is a notifiable instrument and cannot reduce a statutory minimum.

50. Section 21K lists what the Tribunal must consider. The list is parliamentary and administrative: numbers, Houses, workload, leadership, geography, scrutiny, safe workloads, comparability, history, change of responsibility, and the responsible use of public money. Section 21L lists what the Tribunal must not consider. The list is political: ideology, policy, speeches, votes, inquiries, criticism of the Government, polling, popularity, media sentiment, electoral threat, willingness to negotiate, and ministerial representations seeking favourable or unfavourable treatment. A staffing decision that turns on any of those matters is a political decision dressed as an administrative one. The Bill forbids it.

51. Section 21M requires a classification framework with reasonable access to administration, research, policy, legislative analysis, media, senior and specialist advisory work, and chief-of-staff functions. Comparable work receives comparable classification. Classification cannot be lowered because of affiliation, opinion, disagreement or scrutiny. The framework must sit with the applicable fair work instrument, including the Commonwealth Members of Parliament Staff Enterprise Agreement as in force from time to time.

52. Section 21N prohibits defeating an entitlement by low classification, shortened hours, withheld salary authority, artificial ceilings, lesser-value replacements or stripped benefits. A right that can be hollowed out in payroll is not a right.

53. Section 21P recalculates a statutory entitlement automatically when representation changes. An increase takes effect from the legal change. Administrative delay does not postpone it. Section 21Q requires the Tribunal to review additional allocations on a short timetable after elections, Senate terms, by-elections and party-status changes, and on request. Interim determinations are available where delay would impair parliamentary work.

54. Section 21R makes the Tribunal independent. The Prime Minister and Ministers may make submissions on the same basis as other parliamentarians. They have no veto, no special standing and no right of approval. Section 21S requires fairness, consistency and speed. Adverse changes to an existing additional allocation require notice, reasons and a chance to be heard. Ordinary decision time is 20 business days. Missing that time does not kill the application. Section 21T is reconsideration. It does not touch a statutory minimum.

55. Section 21U is the public Parliamentary Staffing Register. It publishes numbers, full-time-equivalent value, classification ranges, legal basis and commencement date for the Government, the Official Opposition, each non-government party and the independents. It does not publish names. It is updated within seven days. A staffing system that cannot be seen cannot be tested. Section 21V requires written reasons, published with the determination.

56. Section 21W prohibits a politically motivated reduction of an additional allocation during a term. Reduction is available only for loss of representation or office, material cessation of the supporting function, or a neutral change applying consistently to comparable parliamentarians. A reduction because of opposition to legislation, an inquiry, criticism, a vote, a document request, a question, committee scrutiny or increased popularity is invalid. Staffing is not a discipline mechanism.

57. Section 21X is the anti-avoidance rule. Using funding, delay, payroll, classification, hours, a different staffing category, an internal budget ceiling or another statutory power to achieve what Part IIIA forbids directly has no legal effect. A failure to act does not postpone or extinguish the entitlement. Section 21Y prohibits offsetting a Part IIIA entitlement against electorate staff, offices, IT, communications, travel, research support or another parliamentary resource. The Bill does not permit the Executive to give with one hand and take with the other.

58. Section 21Z requires Finance, the Parliamentary Workplace Support Service and any other relevant entity to give practical effect. They must not re-impose Prime Ministerial approval where the Act no longer requires it. Statutory-minimum implementation starts immediately. Section 21ZA lets the Tribunal require the information it needs.

59. Section 21ZB confers Federal Court jurisdiction. Standing sits with an affected parliamentarian, a parliamentary leader, and a person whose employment is directly affected. Available orders include declaration, injunction, administrative relief, restraint and setting aside. Fair Work rights are not displaced. A right without a court is a request.

60. Section 21ZC keeps expenditure on appropriation and requires the Finance Minister to make reasonable provision in the estimates. An internal budget cannot cut a statutory entitlement. Section 21ZD requires an annual Tribunal report to both Presiding Officers, tabled within 10 sitting days, covering entitlements, applications, decision times, delays, disparities and recommended amendments. Staff are not identified.

61. Item 12 adds subsection 14(6) so that redistribution, Opposition reallocation, a section 11A transfer, replacement of a section 4 determination by a statutory minimum, or an administrative change to implement Part IIIA is not, of itself, a termination.

62. Item 13 lets the Tribunal direct that employment that would otherwise terminate under section 14 continues for a specified period where that is reasonably necessary for an orderly transition. The Prime Minister cannot refuse, revoke or vary that direction.

63. Item 14 stops the Prime Minister delegating a power that Part IIIA prohibits the Prime Minister from exercising. A prohibition that can be handed to a staffer is not a prohibition.

64. Item 15 requires an independent review of Part IIIA within three years of commencement and at least every five years after that. Reviewers cannot be the Government, a party, Finance, or a person who runs an allocation under review. The report is tabled within 15 sitting days.

Schedule 2 — Amendment of the Remuneration Tribunal Act 1973

65. Item 1 inserts subsection 5(2F). Subsection 5(2E) is already occupied by the Parliamentary Business Resources Act 2017. The Bill does not collide with that function.

66. Item 2 inserts section 7A. The Tribunal has the Part IIIA functions, must act independently, may inquire and obtain information, may receive submissions, cannot be directed by a Minister as to a particular allocation or outcome, and must isolate a member with an actual or reasonably perceived conflict of interest. A tribunal that can be leaned on is not a tribunal.

67. Item 3 adds subsection 11(5) for parliamentary-staffing inquiries: the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence, must observe procedural fairness, may inform itself as it considers appropriate, and must treat substantially comparable matters consistently. Item 4 requires the Tribunal's annual report under section 12AA to include a summary of the new function.

Schedule 3 — Application, saving and transitional provisions

68. Item 1 defines amended Act, commencement day, existing non-government allocation and transition period (90 days).

69. Item 2 continues existing non-government allocations until they are absorbed into a Part IIIA entitlement or lawfully cease. Item 3 freezes numbers, full-time-equivalent value and material classification during the transition period. No non-government party or parliamentarian goes backwards in that window.

70. Item 4 applies statutory minimums from commencement day. If the minimum exceeds the existing allocation, Finance must make the additional positions administratively available within 14 days. Late paperwork does not postpone the legal entitlement. The right is the Act. The payroll is the consequence.

71. Item 5 provides that commencement does not, of itself, terminate an existing personal employee. Service, salary, leave and other entitlements continue. Item 6 continues existing employment agreements except to the extent of inconsistency with the amended Act.

72. Item 7 continues pre-commencement Prime Ministerial instruments only to the extent they are consistent with the amended Act. An instrument that cuts a statutory entitlement, interferes with party distribution, imposes a discriminatory classification, conflicts with a Tribunal determination or otherwise circumvents Part IIIA has no effect after commencement.

73. Item 8 requires the Register within 60 days. Item 9 requires the Tribunal to open a comprehensive review within 60 days and complete it within 120 days, covering statutory minimums, existing additional positions and classifications, leadership functions, comparability, committee and legislative workload, and any material historical disparity.

74. Item 10 states that an existing allocation above the floor is not automatically reduced. The Tribunal assesses any additional amount against section 21K. Exceeding the floor is not, by itself, a ground for reduction. Item 11 calculates the first statutory minimum from official parliamentary records on commencement day. Item 12 authorises the Tribunal, Finance, the Parliamentary Workplace Support Service and the parliamentary departments to prepare before commencement so the amended Act operates on day one.